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Noennig: The De Facto Corporation Doctrine In Montana

THE DE FACTO CORPORATION DOCTRINE IN
MONTANA
Mark E. Noennig
I.

A.

De Jure CORPORATIONS

Conditions Precedent

Corporation statutes traditionally prescribe mandatory conditions precedent to incorporation.' One or more incorporators must
sign and acknowledge a document called the articles of incorporation and file it with the secretary of state. These statutes require
various specific information such as the name, address, nature of
business, and the number of authorized shares of the corporation to
be set forth in the articles.'
B.

Compliance

A corporation which substantially complies with all of these
mandatory conditions precedent to incorporaton is a de jure corporation (a lawful corporation) .3It is a separate legal entity possessing
all of the attributes or powers incident to a corporation: limited
liability; continuity of life; the power to sue and be sued; the power
to hold and convey property; the capacity to contract; and the right
to exercise corporate powers.4 Since the mandatory conditions precedent have been substantially complied with, the right of a de jure
corporation to exist and act cannot be collaterally attacked by any
party, nor can it be successfully attacked directly by the state in a
quo warranto proceeding. 5 In other words, the law will always recognize the corporate character of a de jure corporation.'

II.

DEFECTIVELY FORMED CORPORATIONS

A.

The Nullity Theory
It follows, then, that a corporation which fails to comply with
1. For general discussions of conditions precedent, see H. HENN, LAw oF CORPORATIONS
238-39 (2d ed. 1970) (hereinafter cited as HENN); N. LArnI, LATrru ON CORPOATIONS 179-80
(2d ed. 1971) (hereinafter cited as LATF).
2. See Revised Codes of Montana (1947) (hereinafter cited as R.C.M. 1947), §§ 15-2247
to 15-2249.
3. 8 W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE COR'ORATIONS § 3760 (rev. perm.
ed. 1966) (hereinafter cited as FLETCHER); HENN at 238-39; LATrIN at 181.
4. HENN at 109-10; LAUr
at 184.
5. FLETCHER at § 3760; HENN at 238; R. STEVENS, PRIVATE CORPORATIONS 136 (2d ed.
1949) (hereinafter cited as STEVENS).
6. Failure to perform a condition subsequent to incorporation, such as compliance with
a minimum paid-in capital requirement or filing of certain reports, may result in revocation
of a de jure corporation's corporate status. HENN at 238-39.
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mandatory conditions precedent to incorporation is not a de jure
corporation.7 Since it is inevitable that the statutory formalities for
formation of a corporation will not always be met, courts are faced
with the problem of how to treat defectively organized corporations.
One approach is to treat the corporation as a nullity, that is, as
though no corporation has been formed.' Thus the "corporation"
has none of the corporate attributes. For example, suits by parties
on contractual obligations purportedly assumed by corporations or
for torts committed by purported corporations can be defended on
the basis that no corporation existed. Suits brought by the
''corporation" can be defended by other parties on the same
grounds. Conveyances may also be invalidated. Parties can sue the
associates, shareholders, incorporators, or officers of what was purported to be a corporation and hold them personally liable on
"corporate" obligations.
The soundness of the nullity theory is questionable. In some
instances, there may have been an intentional failure to comply
with the requirements by those responsible, hoping to successfully
avoid liability. A court's disregard of corporateness in these circumstances would be just if the responsible parties are held personally
liable. Unfortunately, the proper parties may not be held responsible. Instead, the result may be to penalize investors, employees,
customers and creditors without harming the promoters who have
long since departed.
In other instances, the failure to comply may be due to the
negligence of the attorney or an innocent mistake of people who
tried to form a corporation without legal help. Then the harsh results of disregarding corporateness may not be justified.
Another problem with the nullity approach is that it may deny
corporate attributes on the basis of omitted formalities which bear
no relation to corporate existence. Further, creditors, who are concerned only that an enterprise was organized and business was done
in good faith, may profit from defects in formalities that do not
affect them.
Compliance with statutory formalities is the appropriate concern of the state, since it gives a corporation its powers and prescribes the method for its formation. Therefore, it is the state which
should bring the action directly attacking the corporation when statutory formalities have not been met.
FLETCHER at § 3760; HENN at 240-41.
For a general discussion of the nullity theory, see A. CONRAD, CORPORATIONS IN
PERSPECTIVE 245-250 (1976) (hereinafter cited as CONRAD). See also H. BALLANTINE, BALLANTINE ON CORPORATIONS 68-71 (rev. ed. 1946) (hereinafterd cited as BALLANTINE); LATrIN at 183;
STEvENs at 173-80.
7.
8.
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Because of the harsh results which accompany the nullity
theory, American courts have been reluctant to apply it.'
B.

The De Facto Doctrine

Rather than finding that a defectively formed corporation (one
that is not de jure) is a nullity, courts iend to treat it as a corporation in fact-a de facto corporation. 10 In order to be fair to innocent
parties who have attempted to organize a corporation or who have
dealt with a purported corporation, and at the same time prevent
unauthorized use of corporateness, courts have developed standards
for recognition of a de facto corporation. The traditional elements
are (1) the existence of a statute under which the corporation might
have been validly incorporated; (2) colorable attempt in good faith
to comply with such statute; and (3) some user or exercise of corporate privileges. If these elements are established, a de facto corporation exists."
Like a de jure corporation, a de facto corporation cannot be
attacked by any private party." It is subject to the same liabilities,
duties, and responsibilities as a de jure corporation. 3 Unlike a de
jure corporation, however, it can be successfully attacked by the
state in a quo warranto proceeding. 4
The concept of de facto corporations has been sharply criticized. Although courts purport to apply the elements of the doctrine, these requirements have not been interpreted consistently.
The doctrine is characterized as "a discouraging and baffling
maze," 5 "legal conceptionalism at its worst,""5 and "inaccurate and
confusing." 7 After an exhaustive review of cases purporting to apply
the doctrine, Professor Frey of the University of Pennsylvania Law
School found the doctrine ineffective. He criticized the de facto-de
jure distinction because it fails to reveal what acts of incomplete
compliance are sufficient to constitute "substantial" compliance,
9.

CONRAD at 249-50.
10. FLETCHER at § 3736-3888; HENN at 240-41; LArrN at 184.
11. FLETCHER at § 3761; HENN at 239; STEvEms at 139. Montana has recognized the
doctrine in Sun River Stock and Land Co. v. Montana Trust and Savings Bank, 81 Mont.
222, 262 P. 1039 (1928). In that case, the court applied the traditional elements and found a
de facto corporation rather than a partnership, even though there were only two incorporators
rather than the three required (citing Daily v. Marshall, 47 Mont. 377, 133 P. 681 (1913)).
Id., 81 Mont. at 235-6.
12. BALAN'iNE at 74; FLETCHER at § 3761; HENN at 239.
13. FLETCHER at § 3856.
14. BALLANTINE at 74; FLETCHER at § 3771; HENN at 240.
15. BALLANnNE at 71.
16. Frey, Legal Analysis and the "De Facto" Doctrine, U. PA. L. REV. 1153, 1180 (1952)
(hereinafter cited as Frey).
17. STEvEs at 135.
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and what acts, insufficient for "substantial" compliance, are nevertheless enough for a "colorable" attempt to comply.'"
It appears that the court decisions do not apply the doctrine,
but recite it to justify the result the court deems to be fair. "[I]f
the decision is adverse to the defendants, the court is quite likely
to assign as a reason that the association is not a 'de facto' corporation, but . . . this is not a reason but a mere reiteration of the

ultimate judgment."'" Frey concluded "that the traditional doctrine
of 'de facto' corporation is just so much jargon and ought to be
abandoned."2

As mentioned, one of the reasons for the creation of the de facto
doctrine is to be fair to those who deal with a purported corporation.
The existence of specific elements which must be met before a de
facto corporation exists assures predictability and finality in business dealings. But as a result of the inconsistent application of the
doctrine, this purpose is thwarted. There are no uniform criteria
which will be applied to determine whether or not a corporation is
formed and will be recognized.
I.

THE ACT

As a result of the criticism of the de facto doctrine, the drafters
of the Model Business Corporations Act (hereinafter cited as the
Model Act) provided for the elimination of the concept. 2' The statutory pattern chosen provides that the issuance of the certificate of
incorporation by the secretary of state "shall be conclusive evidence
18. Frey at 1156.
19. Id. at 1179.
20. Id. at 1178.
21. Prior to 1969, the comment to section 50 of the Model Act stated (after noting that
de jure corporation is complete when the certificate is issued): "Since it is unlikely that any
steps short of securing a certificate of incorporation would be held to constitute apparent
compliance, the possibility that a de facto corporation could exist under such a provision is
remote." See Robertson v. Levy, 197 A.2d 443, 446 (D.C. Cir. 1964). In 1969, section 50 was
renumbered section 56. At the same time, the comment was also changed: "Under the unequivocal provisions of the Model Act, any steps short of securing a certificate of incorporation
would not constitute apparent compliance. Therefore a de facto corporation cannot exist
under the Model Act." Comment, 2 Model Bus. Corp. Act Ann. 2d § 56 (1971). The comment
to section 146 of the Model Act states:
This section is designed to prohibit the application of any theory of de facto incorporation. The only authority to act as a corporation under the Model Act arises from
completion of the procedures prescribed in sections 53 to 55 inclusive. The consequences of those procedures are specified in section 56 as being the creation of a
corporation. No other means being authorized, the effect of section 146 is to negate
the possibility of a de facto corporation.
Abolition of the concept of de facto incorporation, which at best was fuzzy, is
a sound result. No reason exists for its continuance under general corporate laws,
where the process of acquiring de jure incorporation is both simple and clear. The
vestigial appendage should be removed.
Comment, 2 Model Bus. Corp. Act Ann. 2d § 146 (1971).
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that all conditions precedent . . . have been complied with ' 2 2 and
"[aill persons who assume to act as a corporation without authority so to do shall be jointly and severally liable for all debts and
liabilities incurred or arising as a result thereof."2
The Model Act has been widely construed as abolishing the de
facto doctrine.2 4 The leading case is Robertson v. Levy.15 There, the

District of Columbia Court of Appeals held the president of a purported corporation personally liable on a lease obligation entered
into after the articles of incorporation had been submitted, but prior
to their acceptance and filing. The articles were then rejected and
no certificate was issued. Although the articles were later refiled and
accepted, the president had assumed to act as a corporation before
acceptance of the articles, with no authority to do so." The court
held that "the impact of these sections (sections 56 and 146 of the
Model Act), when considered together, is to eliminate the concepts
of estoppel and de facto corporations. .

.

. The certificate of incor-

poration provides the cut off point; before it is issued, the individuals and not the corporation, are liable." 7
It appears that this construction of the Model Act gives rise to
some of the problems associated with the nullity theory. In the
Robertson case, for example, the president was held liable as a
result of a defect which may have been insignificant. Similarly, an
attorney's failure to file the articles before his corporate client trans28
acts business may result in a malpractice suit against the attorney.
Under the nullity theory, however, associates and outside parties
must transact business without legal assurance of the corporate
status or their own personal liability.
The statutory scheme has advantages over both the de facto
doctrine and the nullity theory. It provides that the state (the secretary of state), which is the entity most concerned with corporate
existence, shall determine whether or not the statutory formalities
have been satisfied. The courts will seldom be faced with that question. It also provides a clear cut off point which denotes corporate
existence-the issuance of the certificate of incorporation. Thus,
parties can rely on the certificate as conclusive evidence of compli22. 2 Model Bus. Corp. Act Ann. 2d § 56 (1971); R.C.M. 1947, § 2250.
23. 2 Model Bus. Corp. Act Ann. 2d § 146 (1971); R.C.M. 1947, § 15-22-135.
24. E.g., Timberline Equip. Co. v. Davenport, 267 Or. 64, 69, 514 P.2d 1109, 1111
(1973); Swindel v. Kelly, 499 P.2d 291, 299 (Alaska 1972); Robertson v. Levy, 197 A.2d 443,
447 (D.C. Cir. 1964); CONRAD at 248; FLETCHER at § 3762.1; HENN at 245. It appears that Utah
retains the de facto doctrine in spite of the Model Act provisions. Vincent Drug Co. v. Utah

State Tax Comm'n, 17 Utah 2d 202, 407 P.2d 683 (1965).
25. Robertson v. Levy, 1'97 A.2d 443 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
26. Id. at 447.
27. Id.
28. Conway v. Samet, 300 N.Y.S. 2d 243, 246 (1969).
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ance. Corporate members and parties dealing with the corporation
have notice that business transactions before issuance of the certificate will be entered without the consequences of corporate attributes and powers. The result is the desired uniformity and predictability in business dealings which is absent with the de facto concept
and the nullity theory.

IV.
A.

THE CASE

Introduction

Montana enacted the Montana Business Corporation Act, a
modified version of the Model Act, in 1967.29 But recently, in
Montana Ass'n of Underwriters v. State,30 Athe Montana supreme
court purportedly applied the de facto doctrine. Ignoring the Model
Act precedent, the court held that Montana Benefits, Inc. (MBI)
was, in effect, a de facto corporation at the time it contracted with
the state, although it had not yet filed its articles with the secretary
3
of state. '
B.

The Opinion

On September 17, 1975, the State Department of Administration (DOA), pursuant to Montana statute, 32 entered into a written
agreement with Montana Public Benefit Services Co., Inc., the
predecessor of MBI, giving it the right to establish and administer
a plan of deferred compensation for public employees. On October
8, 1975, Montana Public Employees Benefit Services Co., Inc., was
incorporated. It later changed its name to MBI. The DOA entered
into an identical contract with MBI.
The plaintiff, Montana Association of Life Underwriters, an
association whose members are involved in employee pension plans,
filed an action in district court to block implementation of the deferred compensation plan.3 3 After the suit was filed (and after the
incorporation date), the DOA entered into a third contract with
MBI identical to the previous contracts. The district court granted
summary judgment to the defendants. The supreme court affirmed
29. R.C.M. 1947, §§ 15-2201 to 15-22-140. For a discussion of the Montana modifications of the Model Act, see Schaefer, The Status of the Adoption of the Model Business
CorporationAct in Montana-A Commentary, 36 MoNT. L. REv. 29 (1975). Professor Schaefer
recommends abolition of the de facto doctrine under Montana's act. 36 MONT. L. REV. at 58.
563 P.2d 577 (1977)
Mont. _
30. Montana Ass'n of Underwriters v. State, (hereinafter cited as Montana Underwriters).
31. Id. at _ 563 P.2d at 581.
32. R.C.M. 1947, §§ 68-2701 to 2709.
563 P.2d at 578.
Mont. at -,
33. Montana Underwriters, -

https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol39/iss2/7

6

19781

DEDeFACTO
CORPORATIONS
Noennig: The
Facto Corporation
Doctrine In Montana

on appeal, responding, inter alia,3 to the plaintiff's contention that
MBI lacked contractual capacity by stating that MBI was a de facto
corporation. The court found that "[a]lthough . . . (MBI) . . .
was defective in its creation and not a de jure corporation, this was
the result of a bona fide attempt to incorporate under the existing
statutory authority, coupled with the exercise of corporate powers." ' Citing neither case authority nor the Montana Business Corporation Act, and relying solely on 8 Fletcher Cyc. Corp. (Perm.
Ed.), Chap. 45, §3862, and cases cited therein, the court held that
MBI, being in effect a de facto corporation, had the same capacity
to contract as a de jure corporation." Thus, the contract with the
DOA was not void, but merely voidable at the state's option. Since
the state took no later
action to void it, and in fact ratified it, the
37
contract was valid.
C. Analysis
If the Montana court had construed the Model Act as abolishing the de facto doctrine in this case, it should have found the first
contract between MBI void and not voidable, because that corporation had not yet filed its articles of incorporation and received its
certificate. Therefore, MBI was not a corporation and had no power
to contract as a corporation. In the absence of the de facto doctrine,
MBI could not have been found a "private corporation or institution"-the only entities capable of entering such a contract under
the deferred compensation statute.s
In this case, however, it was unnecessary for the court to have
considered whether or not MBI was a de facto corporation at the
time of the first contract. Regardless of whether or not the first
contract was valid, the subsequent contract was valid. It was an
identical contract entered into after MBI was incorporated. Therefore, the challenge to MBI's capacity to contract before incorporation was moot. Since the court found the MBI plan complied with
the statutory language, it properly held that implementation of the
plan could not be blocked.
Thus the court properly affirmed the district court but unnecessarily purported to apply the de facto doctrine. In doing so, it unfor34. The court held that the language of the statute, R.C.M. 1947, §§ 68-2701 through
68-2709, permitted implementation of the deferred compensation plan involved. Montana
Underwriters, Mont. at -,
563 P.2d at 580. The court refused to review the question
of whether the DOA had the power to grant an exclusive contract to MBI, because that issue
had not been previously raised. Id. at -,
563 P.2d at 581.
35. Montana Underwriters, Mont. at -,
563 P.2d at 581.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. R.C.M. 1947, § 68-2703.
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tunately did not consider the impact of the Model Act. Although the
court relied on Fletcher's Cyclopedia of Corporations, upon further
investigation it would have found that Fletcher recognizes abolition
of the de facto doctrine by the Model Act."9
V.

CONCLUSION

By discussing the de facto doctrine after the Model Act has
been adopted and not clearly resolving the question of whether or
not the doctrine has been abolished, the Montana supreme court
added to the existing confusion in the law regarding defectively
formed corporations. When the issue is properly raised in a future
case, the Montana court should consider the intent of the drafters
of the Model Act and the Montana legislature, the potential harshness in abolishing the doctrine, the need for uniformity in application of the requirements for incorporation, and the confusion in
applying the de facto-de jure distinction. It should then establish a
clear, definitive holding which will determine whether Montana
courts will continue to apply the de facto doctrine, with all its shortcomings, or whether the adoption of the Model Act precludes its
applicaton.
39. "[Plrovisions of the Model Business Corporation Act ... have been construed as
eliminating the concepts of de facto corporations and corporations by estoppel." FLETCHER
at § 3762.1.
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